英文原文：
I．Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property，Issued by the U.S. DoJ and the FTC
II. Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, Issued by the FTC and the U.S. DoJ in April 2000
III. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the European Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of their Competition Laws
IV. Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels [C(98)35/Final]
V. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, Issued by the U.S. DoJ and the FTC in April 1995
I.
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property
Issued by the U.S. DOJ and the FTC
April 6, 1995
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Intellectual property protection and the antitrust laws
2. General principles
2.1 Standard antitrust analysis applies to intellectual property
2.2 Intellectual property and market power
2.3 Procompetitive benefits of licensing
3. Antitrust concerns and modes of analysis
3.1 Nature of the concerns
3.2 Markets affected by licensing arrangements
3.2.1 Goods markets
3.2.2 Technology markets
3.2.3 Reseach and development: Innovation markets
3.3 Horizontal and vertical relationships
3.4 Framework for evaluating licensing restraints
4. General principles concerning the Agencies’ evaluation of licensing arrangements
4.1 Analysis of anticompetitive effects
4.1.1 Market structure, coordination, and foreclosure
4.1.2 Licensing arrangements involving exclusivity
4.2 Efficiencies and justifications
4.3 Antitrust "safety zone"
5. Application of general principles
5.1 Horizontal restraints
5.2 Resale price maintenance
5.3 Tying arrangements
5.4 Exclusive dealing
5.5 Cross-licensing and pooling arrangements
5.6 Grantbacks
5.7 Acquisition of intellectual property rights
6. Enforcement of invalid intellectual property rights
1. Intellectual property protection and the antitrust laws
1.0 These Guidelines state the antitrust enforcement policy of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (individually, "the Agency," and collectively, "the Agencies") with respect to the licensing of intellectual property protected by patent, copyright, and trade secret law, and of know-how. By stating their general policy, the Agencies hope to assist those who need to predict whether the Agencies will challenge a practice as anticompetitive. However, these Guidelines cannot remove judgment and discretion in antitrust law enforcement. Moreover, the standards set forth in these Guidelines must be applied in unforeseeable circumstances. Each case will be evaluated in light of its own facts, and these Guidelines will be applied reasonably and flexibly.
In the United States, patents confer rights to exclude others from making, using, or selling in the United States the invention claimed by the patent for a period of seventeen years from the date of issue. To gain patent protection, an invention (which may be a product, process, machine, or composition of matter) must be novel, nonobvious, and useful. Copyright protection applies to original works of authorship embodied in a tangible medium of expression. A copyright protects only the expression, not the underlying ideas. Unlike a patent, which protects an invention not only from copying but also from independent creation, a copyright does not preclude others from independently creating similar expression. Trade secret protection applies to information whose economic value depends on its not being generally known. Trade secret protection is conditioned upon efforts to maintain secrecy and has no fixed term. As with copyright protection, trade secret protection does not preclude independent creation by others.
The intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share the common purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare. The intellectual property laws provide incentives for innovation and its dissemination and commercialization by establishing enforceable property rights for the creators of new and useful products, more efficient processes, and original works of expression. In the absence of intellectual property rights, imitators could more rapidly exploit the efforts of innovators and investors without compensation. Rapid imitation would reduce the commercial value of innovation and erode incentives to invest, ultimately to the detriment of consumers. The antitrust laws promote innovation and consumer welfare by prohibiting certain actions that may harm competition with respect to either existing or new ways of serving consumers.
2. General principles
2.0 These Guidelines embody three general principles:
for the purpose of antitrust analysis, the Agencies regard intellectual property as being essentially comparable to any other form of property; the Agencies do not presume that intellectual property creates market power in the antitrust context; and the Agencies recognize that intellectual property licensing allows firms to combine complementary factors of production and is generally procompetitive.
2.1 Standard antitrust analysis applies to intellectual property
……Intellectual property law bestows on the owners of intellectual property certain rights to exclude others. These rights help the owners to profit from the use of their property. An intellectual property owner’s rights to exclude are similar to the rights enjoyed by owners of other forms of private property. As with other forms of private property, certain types of conduct with respect to intellectual property may have anticompetitive effects against which the antitrust laws can and do protect. Intellectual property is thus neither particularly free from scrutiny under the antitrust laws, nor particularly suspect under them.
The Agencies recognize that the licensing of intellectual property is often international. The principles of antitrust analysis described in these Guidelines apply equally to domestic and international licensing arrangements. However, as described in the 1995 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, considerations particular to international operations, such as jurisdiction and comity, may affect enforcement decisions when the arrangement is in an international context.
2.2 Intellectual property and market power
Market power is the ability profitably to maintain prices above, or output below, competitive levels for a significant period of time. The Agencies will not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner. Although the intellectual property right confers the power to exclude with respect to the specific product, process, or work in question, there will often be sufficient actual or potential close substitutes for such product, process, or work to prevent the exercise of market power. If a patent or other form of intellectual property does confer market power, that market power does not by itself offend the antitrust laws. As with any other tangible or intangible asset that enables its owner to obtain significant supracompetitive profits, market power (or even a monopoly) that is solely "a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident" does not violate the antitrust laws. Nor does such market power impose on the intellectual property owner an obligation to license the use of that property to others. As in other antitrust contexts, however, market power could be illegally acquired or maintained, or, even if lawfully acquired and maintained, would be relevant to the ability of an intellectual property owner to harm competition through unreasonable conduct in connection with such property.
3. Antitrust concerns and modes of analysis
3.1 Nature of the concerns
While intellectual property licensing arrangements are typically welfare-enhancing and procompetitive, antitrust concerns may nonetheless arise. For example, a licensing arrangement could include restraints that adversely affect competition in goods markets by dividing the markets among firms that would have competed using different technologies. See, e.g., Example 7. An arrangement that effectively merges the research and development activities of two of only a few entities that could plausibly engage in research and development in the relevant field might harm competition for development of new goods and services. See section 3.2.3. An acquisition of intellectual property may lessen competition in a relevant antitrust market. See section 5.7. The Agencies will focus on the actual effects of an arrangement, not on its formal terms…..
3.2 Markets affected by licensing arrangements
Licensing arrangements raise concerns under the antitrust laws if they are likely to affect adversely the prices, quantities, qualities, or varieties of goods and services either currently or potentially available. The competitive effects of licensing arrangements often can be adequately assessed within the relevant markets for the goods affected by the arrangements. In such instances, the Agencies will delineate and analyze only goods markets. In other cases, however, the analysis may require the delineation of markets for technology or markets for research and development (innovation markets) ….
3.3 Horizontal and vertical relationships
As with other property transfers, antitrust analysis of intellectual property licensing arrangements examines whether the relationship among the parties to the arrangement is primarily horizontal or vertical in nature, or whether it has substantial aspects of both…
The existence of a horizontal relationship between a licensor and its licensees does not, in itself, indicate that the arrangement is anticompetitive. Identification of such relationships is merely an aid in determining whether there may be anticompetitive effects arising from a licensing arrangement. Such a relationship need not give rise to an anticompetitive effect, nor does a purely vertical relationship assure that there are no anticompetitive effects…..
3.4 Framework for evaluating licensing restraints
In the vast majority of cases, restraints in intellectual property licensing arrangements are evaluated under the rule of reason. The Agencies’ general approach in analyzing a licensing restraint under the rule of reason is to inquire whether the restraint is likely to have anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that outweigh those anticompetitive effects. See Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); 7 Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Law § 1502 (1986). See also part 4.
In some cases, however, the courts conclude that a restraint’s "nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive" that it should be treated as unlawful per se, without an elaborate inquiry into the restraint’s likely competitive effect. Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990); National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). Among the restraints that have been held per se unlawful are naked price-fixing, output restraints, and market division among horizontal competitors, as well as certain group boycotts and resale price maintenance.
To determine whether a particular restraint in a licensing arrangement is given per se or rule of reason treatment, the Agencies will assess whether the restraint in question can be expected to contribute to an efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity. ….
4. General principles concerning the Agencies’ evaluation of licensing arrangements under the rule of reason
4.1 Analysis of anticompetitive effects
The existence of anticompetitive effects resulting from a restraint in a licensing arrangement will be evaluated on the basis of the analysis described in this section.
4.1.1 Market structure, coordination, and foreclosure
When a licensing arrangement affects parties in a horizontal relationship, a restraint in that arrangement may increase the risk of coordinated pricing, output restrictions, or the acquisition or maintenance of market power. Harm to competition also may occur if the arrangement poses a significant risk of retarding or restricting the development of new or improved goods or processes. The potential for competitive harm depends in part on the degree of concentration in, the difficulty of entry into, and the responsiveness of supply and demand to changes in price in the relevant markets. Cf. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines §§ 1.5, 3.
….
4.3 Antitrust "safety zone"
Because licensing arrangements often promote innovation and enhance competition, the Agencies believe that an antitrust "safety zone" is useful in order to provide some degree of certainty and thus to encourage such activity. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Agencies will not challenge a restraint in an intellectual property licensing arrangement if (1) the restraint is not facially anticompetitive and (2) the licensor and its licensees collectively account for no more than twenty percent of each relevant market significantly affected by the restraint. This "safety zone" does not apply to those transfers of intellectual property rights to which a merger analysis is applied. See section 5.7.
….
5. Application of general principles
5.0 This section illustrates the application of the general principles discussed above to particular licensing restraints and to arrangements that involve the cross-licensing, pooling, or acquisition of intellectual property. The restraints and arrangements identified are typical of those that are likely to receive antitrust scrutiny; however, they are not intended as an exhaustive list of practices that could raise competitive concerns.
5.1 Horizontal restraints
…….
Following the general principles outlined in section 3.4, horizontal restraints often will be evaluated under the rule of reason. In some circumstances, however, that analysis may be truncated; additionally, some restraints may merit per se treatment, including price fixing, allocation of markets or customers, agreements to reduce output, and certain group boycotts.
…..
5.7 Acquisition of intellectual property rights
Certain transfers of intellectual property rights are most appropriately analyzed by applying the principles and standards used to analyze mergers, particularly those in the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The Agencies will apply a merger analysis to an outright sale by an intellectual property owner of all of its rights to that intellectual property and to a transaction in which a person obtains through grant, sale, or other transfer an exclusive license for intellectual property (i.e., a license that precludes all other persons, including the licensor, from using the licensed intellectual property). Such transactions may be assessed under section 7 of the Clayton Act, sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
II. ……
III. ……
IV. ……
V. Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, Issued by the U.S. DoJ and the FTC in April 1995
一、《与知识产权许可有关的反托拉斯指南》，美国司法部与联邦贸易委员会1995年4月6日颁布
二、《竞争者合谋反托拉斯指南》，美国司法部与联邦贸易委员会2000年4月颁布
三、《美国政府与欧共体关于在执行竞争法中适用积极礼让原则的协议》
四、《经合组织理事会有关反"核心卡特尔"有效行动的建议》[理事会(98)35/最终文件]
五、《国际经营反托拉斯执法指南》，美国司法部与联邦贸易委员会1995年4月颁布
一、
《与知识产权许可有关的反托拉斯指南》
美国司法部与联邦贸易委员会联合颁布
1995年4月6日
目录
1、知识产权保护与反托拉斯法
2、一般原则
2.1 适用于知识产权的标准反托拉斯分析
2.2 知识产权和市场力量
2.3 许可的竞争好处
3、反托拉斯问题与分析模式
3.1 问题的本质
3.2 受许可影响的市场
3.2.1 货物市场
3.2.2 技术市场
3.2.3 研究与开发: 创新市场
3.3 水平与垂直关系
3.4 许可限制的评估框架
4、主管机关评估许可安排的一般原则
4.1 反竞争效果分析
4.1.1 市场结构、协调与预先禁止安排
4.1.2 涉及排他性的许可安排
4.2 效益与理由
4.3 反托拉斯"安全区"
5、一般原则的适用
5.1 水平限制
5.2 维持零售价格
5.3 搭售安排
5.4 排他交易
5.5 交叉许可与集体安排
5.6 回授
5.7 购买知识产权
6、无效知识产权的执行
1. 知识产权保护与反托拉斯法
1.0 本《指南》说明美国司法部和美国联邦贸易委员会（单独或统称为"主管机关"）有关知识产权和专有技术许可方面的反托拉斯执法政策，涉及的这些知识产权受专利、版权和商业秘密法保护。通过对其一般政策进行说明，主管机关希望对需要的人提供帮助，使其初步预测主管机关认定某种做法是否具有反竞争性。但是，本《指南》并不排除反托拉斯执法过程中需要具体进行判决和裁决。另外，本《指南》中规定的各项标准，必须适用于各种不可预见的情况。不同的情况需根据具体事实进行评估，要合理、灵活地使用本《指南》。
在美国，专利授予的权利从专利颁发之日起17年内，排除他人在美国制造、使用、或销售专利包括的发明。为了获得专利保护，有关发明（可以是产品、工艺、机器或物质成分）必须具有新颖性、有独创性、有用性。著作权（版权）保护适用于以有形媒体表示的原创著作权作品。著作权（版权）只保护具体的表达方式，并不保护有关的内在思想。与专利不同，专利不仅保护发明不受复制，而且保护不得进行独立的创造；而著作权（版权）则不排除他人独立地创造类似的表现形式。商业秘密保护的信息经济价值，起决于其不为公众所知。商业秘密保护的前提条件是对保护秘密所做的各种努力，保护不受具体时间限制。与著作权（版权）保护一样，商业秘密保护不排除他人独立地进行创造。
知识产权法与反托拉斯法的共同目的是促进创新，并增强消费者的福利。通过为新型、有用产品，更有效的工艺和原创表达作品的创造者建立可执行的产权，知识产权法为有关创新和传播及商业化提供激励。如果没有知识产权，模仿者就可以更快地利用创新者和投资者的成果，而不付出任何报酬。快速的模仿将减少创新的商业价值，并侵蚀投资的积极性，从而最终给消费者带来损害。反托拉斯法通过禁止某些行动来促进创新、提高消费者福利，被禁止的这些行为可能会在现有或新式客户服务方面损害竞争。
2. 一般原则
2.0 本《指南》体现以下三个一般原则：
1）在反托拉斯分析方面，主管机关将知识产权基本上看成是与任何其他形式的财产具有可比性；主管机关假设知识产权在反托拉斯背景下并不形成市场力量；且主管机关认为，知识产权许可使公司可以结合各种互补生产要素，总体上倾向促进竞争。
2.1 有形、无形财产知识产权标准反托拉斯分析
……知识产权法对知识产权的所有者授予某些权利，排除他人进行使用。这些权利有助于权利所有者充分利用其产权。知识产权所有者排除他人使用的权利类似，于其他形式私人财产所有者享有的权利。同其他形式的私人财产一样，有关知识产权某些类型的行为可能具有反托拉斯法可能并实际阻止的反竞争效果。所以，知识产权既不完全脱离反托拉斯法的管制，又不受反托拉斯法的特别监督。
主管机关承认，知识产权许可通常具有国际性。本《指南》中描述的有关反托拉斯分析原则，同样适用于国内和国际许可安排。但是，正如《1995司法部和联邦贸易委员会国际经营反托拉斯执法指南》中所描述的，有关国际经营的特别考虑，如管辖权和礼让等，在国际背景下，可能影响执法决定。
2.2 知识产权和市场力量
市场力量是一种能力，可以在相当长的时期内将价格维持在竞争水平之上、将产量维持在竞争水平之下，从而获得利润。主管机关假设专利、著作权（版权）或商业秘密并不必然对所有者行成一种市场力量。虽然知识产权授权在特定产品、工艺或有关作品方面具有排他性，这些产品、工艺或有关作品通常存在充分现实或潜在的相关替代品，以阻止市场力量的发挥。如果专利或其他形式的知识产权授予一种市场力量,该市场力量本身并不违反反托拉斯法。同任何其他有形或无形资产一样，或许能够使所有者获得大量的超级竞争利润，但仅"由于优越的市场、业务敏感性或历史事件"构成的市场力量（甚至垄断）并不违反反托拉斯法。该市场力量也不对知识产权所有者施加一种必须许可他人使用该财产的责任。但是，正如在其他反托拉斯背景一样，市场力量可能是非法获得或维持的，或者即使是合法获得和维持的，也可能与知识产权所有者不合法利用其能力有关，通过与该财产有关的不合理行为，损害竞争。
3. 反托拉斯问题与分析模式
3.1 问题的本质
知识产权许可安排通常具有增加福利、提高竞争的效果，但反托拉斯问题还是会在某些情况下出现。例如,一项许可安排可能包括各种限制，通过在使用不同技术相互竞争的公司之间进行货物市场划分，对竞争造成负面影响。参见案例7。一项安排如果有效地将几个在相关领域从事开发与研究的实体中两家的研究与开发活动合并在一起，则有可能损害新货物与服务开发方面的竞争。参见第3.2.3节有关说明。购买知识产权可以减少相关反托拉斯市场中的竞争。参见第5.7节。主管机关主要关注安排的实际效果，而不是其形式上的具体条款。
3.2 受许可影响的市场
如果许可安排可能对当前或潜在可提供的货物或服务的价格、数量、质量或品种造成负面影响，则该许可安排也可能引起有关反托拉斯法问题。许可安排的竞争效果，通常可以在受该安排影响的有关货物市场中进行充分的评估。此时，主管机关将只研究和分析货物市场。但是，在其他有些情况下，分析可能要求对技术市场或研究与开发市场(创新市场)进行细分。……
3.3 水平与垂直关系
同其他财产转让一样，知识产权许可安排的反托拉斯分析要审查安排各方之间的关系本质上主要是水平性质的、还是垂直性质的，或很大程度上具有双重性。……
许可人与被许可人之间水平关系的存在本身并不表明一项安排具有反竞争性。辨别这种关系的存在仅仅使帮助确定一项许可安排是否会发生反竞争效果。该关系并不必然引起反竞争效果，垂直关系本身也不表明具有任何反竞争效果。
3.4 许可限制的评估框架
在绝大多数情况下，知识产权许可安排中的各种限制要根据合理规则进行评估。主管机关根据合理规则对许可限制进行分析的一般方法，是考察该限制是否具有反竞争效果，如果有反竞争效果，则考察该限制是否是使积极竞争效果超过反竞争效果所合理需要。
但是在有些情况下，法院判决认为，限制的"性质和必然效果如此明显的具有反竞争性"，所以本身应该判定为非法，不需要更进一步研究限制可能产生的竞争影响。联邦贸易委员会诉最高法院审判律师协会案（493 U.S. 411, 433 (1990)）；美国全国专业工程师学会诉美国案（435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)）。判定为本身违法的限制情况有：水平竞争对手之间的公开固定价格、产量限制和市场划分，以及某些集体抵制和维持零售价格等。
为了确定许可安排中的特定限制是否适用本身违法或合理规则，主管机关将评估有关限制是否预期促进经济活动的增效一体化。……
4. 主管机关根据合理规则评估许可安排的一般原则
4.1 反竞争效果分析
许可安排中的限制造成的反竞争效果的存在，将根据本节说明的分析方法进行评估。
4.1.1 市场结构、协调与预先禁止安排
如果一项许可安排影响水平关系中的各方，则该安排中的限制就可能增加协调定价、产量限制、购买或维持市场力量的风险。如果一项安排对开发新型或改进型货物或工艺存在重大的推延或限制风险，对竞争的损害也可能会出现。潜在的竞争损害部分起决于相关市场的集中度、进入困难以及供求对价格变动的反应等。参见《1992年水平兼并指南》第1.5节和第3节。
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4.3 反托拉斯"安全区"
由于许可安排通常促进创新并增强竞争，主管机关认为效益与理由是有用的，可以提供某种程度的确定性，并对该活动予以鼓励。在非异常情况下，主管机关对于下列情形中知识产权许可安排存在的限制将不会有什么异议：（1）该限制表面并不具有反竞争性，（2）许可人及其被许可人一起在受限制影响的各相关市场中所占比重不足20%。"这种安全区"并不适用于尖兵分析所适用的有关知识产权权利转让问题。
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5. 一般原则的适用
5.0 本节说明将上述一般原则如何应用于涉及知识产权交叉许可、集体管理和购买的特定许可限制和安排。识别出的这些产权许可限制和安排是可能受到反托拉斯法审查的范例，但是，并不是能引起竞争问题的所有做法方面的清单。
5.1 水平限制
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根据第3.4节说明的一般原则，水平限制通常要根据合理规则进行评估。但是在某些情况下，分析可能会误入歧途；另外，有些限制可能适用本身违法规则，具体包括固定价格、分配市场或客户、协议减少产量以及某些集团抵制等。
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5.7 购买知识产权
某些类型的知识产权权利转让可以通过分析兼并的原则和标准进行适当的分析，尤其是《1992年水平兼并指南》中的各项原则和标准。主管机关将使用兼并的分析方法，来分析知识产权所有者直接出售其对该知识产权享有的所有权利，并用来分析一个人通过赠与、销售或其他转让获得有关知识产权排它许可（如排除所有其他人，包括许可人，使用许可知识产权的许可）的交易。该交易可以根据《克莱顿法》第7条和《谢尔曼法》第1条和第2条以及《联邦贸易委员会法》第5条来进行评估。……
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五、《国际经营反托拉斯执法指南》，美国司法部与联邦贸易委员会1995年4月颁布
目录
1 简介
2 各机关实施的不同反托拉斯法
2.1 《谢尔曼法》
2.2 《克莱顿法》
2.3 《联邦贸易委员会法》
2.4 《1976年哈特-司各特-罗迪诺反托拉斯改进法》
2.5 《全国合作研究与生产法》
2.6 《韦布-波米琳法案》
2.7 《1982年出口贸易公司法》
2.8 其他相关立法
2.8.1 《威尔逊关税法》
2.8.2 《1916年反倾销法》
2.8.3 《1930年关税法》
2.8.3.1 反补贴关税
2.8.3.2 反倾销关税
2.8.3.3 第337节
2.8.4 《1974年贸易法》
2.8.4.1 第201节
2.8.4.2 第301节
2.9 相关国际协议
2.9.1 双边合作协议
2.9.2 国际指南与建议
3 国际执法门槛问题
3.1 管辖权
3.1.1 进口商业行为管辖权
范例一
3.1.2 其他外国商业行为管辖权
3.1.2.1 《1982年对外贸易反托拉斯改进法》第1（一）小节项下案例有关的管辖权
范例二
范例 三
3.1.2.2 《1982年对外贸易反托拉斯改进法》第1（二）小节项下案例有关的管辖权
范例四
范例五
3.1.3 与美国政府融资或购买有关的管辖权
范例六
范例七
3.1.4 《克莱顿法》第7节项下的管辖权
范例八
3.2 礼让
范例九
范例十
3.3 外国政府参与的效果
3.3.1 外国主权豁免
3.3.2 外国主权强制
范例十一
3.3.3 国家行为
3.3.4 主权请求
范例十二
3.4 反托拉斯执法与国际贸易管制
范例十三
范例十四
4 对人管辖权与程序规则
4.1 对人管辖权与审判地
4.2 与外国有关的调查做法
4.2.2 《哈特-司各特-罗迪诺法》：特殊外国商业规则 |
