Competition
policy in the WTO: Doha Declaration issues
Prepared by the Commission on Competition
Table of contents
1. Introduction
2. Summary
3. Non-discrimination
4. Due process and transparency
5. Technical assistance, capacity building and competition advocacy
6. Hard core cartels
7. Modalities of cooperation
Competition policy in the WTO: Doha Declaration
issues
1. Introduction
1.1 In preparation for the 2003 WTO Ministerial Meeting and subsequent
negotiations, paragraph 25 of the Doha Declaration mandated the
Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy
(the "WTO Working Group") to focus on the clarification
of:
(i) core principles, including transparency, non-discrimination
and procedural fairness;
(ii) provisions on hard core cartels;
(iii) modalities for voluntary cooperation; and
(iv) support for progressive reinforcement of competition institutions
in developing countries through capacity building.
1.2 This paper discusses each of these subjects from a private
sector perspective, with the objective of providing input to the
WTO Working Group. Since business plays a central role in the WTO
goal to expand cross border trade in goods and services, ICC assumes
that it is helpful to provide input from a business perspective
to the WTO as it continues its important work on the interaction
between trade and competition policy. ICC represents companies and
associations from over 130 countries and is the only representative
body that speaks with authority on behalf of enterprises from all
sectors in every part of the world.
1.3 ICC continues to support the work of the WTO Working Group
and appreciates the opportunity to contribute. ICC's intention is
to focus discussion on areas that require consideration from the
perspective of international business.
1.4 World business, as represented by ICC, firmly believes that
an open multilateral system that facilitates flows of goods, services
and investment across national borders is a major force for raising
living standards and creating jobs in all parts of the world. Growth
in world trade and investment - which far outpaces growth in world
output - is an essential condition for the spread of job and wealth
creation throughout the world economy. ICC notes that both government
and private sector practices can impede these objectives.
1.5 Governments and business must work more closely together to
design the multilateral rules for the worldwide marketplace that
will be increasingly necessary for the globalization of trade and
investment. The special contribution of business is to help governments
to develop rules that maximize the scope and ability of business
to work productively to create wealth and employment, while maintaining
appropriate individual and business freedoms.
1.6 Competition policy is one of the areas in which an international
framework is germinating, and in which this necessary balance has
to be achieved. Private sector input is necessary to ensure that
the work done is realistic, potentially effective, and balanced,
therefore more likely to be accepted.
2. Summary
2.1 ICC has actively contributed business views to international
discussions on the interaction between trade and competition policy.
In its November 1998 "Statement on future WTO work on competition
and trade", ICC supported the mandate of the WTO Working Group
as established at the December 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference,
but suggested that it should not go beyond educational and informative
discussions among its members on market access issues related to
competition and trade policies. In that note, ICC recommended that
if the WTO Working Group's mandate were to be prolonged, there should
be opportunities for the WTO Working Group to receive and consider
business views. Dialogue with the business community would be essential
should the WTO consider expanding the Working Group's mandate beyond
its current analytical and educational focus.
2.2 In a joint statement with the Business and Industry Advisory
Committee to the OECD (BIAC), "ICC/BIAC comments on report
of the US International Competition Policy Advisory Committee"
(3 June 2000), (the "June 2000 Statement") ICC and BIAC
stated that "the WTO is not an appropriate forum for the review
of private restraints and that the WTO should not develop new competition
laws under its framework at this time…" In the June 2000 Statement,
ICC also took the view that a dispute resolution mechanism within
the framework of a multilateral agreement on competition laws raises
many complex issues and was premature at the time.
2.3 There is broadly shared recognition among ICC members that
the issues in question are complex and that, while efforts are being
made to achieve a workable level of soft harmonization and convergence
in the application of the world's already large number of competition
regimes, there remain significant differences on substantive competition
law principles and their application. Bridging those differences
will require time and a great deal of cooperation among governments,
competition authorities, private sector interests and other stakeholders.
The issue of the inclusion of a competition framework in the WTO
system thus should be assessed very carefully as the WTO proceeds
at its meetings later this year.
2.4 ICC believes that the "core principles" identified
in the Doha declaration that set out this Working Party's present
charter - transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness
- are, as broadly understood, fundamental and that they should be
reflected in the competition regime of every jurisdiction that chooses
to adopt one.
2.5 ICC identifies in this paper key issues that require consideration
in any discussion or analysis of competition policy norms.
2.6 ICC notes that the backdrop for any discussion of procedural
or substantive competition policy norms in a multilateral framework
is constantly changing. In particular, regard must be had not only
to private sector positions such as those put forward by ICC and
BIAC, but the ongoing work of other international organizations
such as the OECD and the International Competition Network (ICN).
Work on many of the issues before the WTO Working Group is proceeding
rapidly in various fora shaped by competition policy and legal developments.
2.7 In particular, ICC encourages the WTO Working Group to carefully
consider in the broader competition policy context, the application
of the principles of transparency, non-discrimination, procedural
fairness and protection of confidential information endorsed in
the merger context, by the ICN at its inaugural conference in Naples,
Italy, September 2002 ("Guiding Principles for Merger Notification
and Review") if and when developing recommendations for going
forward.
2.8 ICC joins in the condemnation of "hard core cartels,"
which victimize business consumers and competitors and ultimate
consumers alike, while noting the importance of addressing important
definitional issues in this connection, as well as the importance
of appropriate safeguards for confidential information in the context
of investigations of cartel activity.
2.9 With respect to modalities for cooperation, ICC encourages
the expanded use of appropriate voluntary "peer review"
mechanisms that periodically subject jurisdictions' competition
regimes to in-depth scrutiny and comment such as those conducted
under the OECD's Regulatory Review program and the WTO's TPRM.
3. Non-discrimination
Competition laws should not discriminate on the basis of nationality
3.1 ICC strongly supports the view that competition laws should
not discriminate on the basis of nationality, and that non-discrimination
should be considered a core principle of all competition laws. Put
another way, the principle of national treatment should apply to
competition laws, i.e., the principle that a government should treat
the goods, services and persons of other nationalities no less favorably
than it treats its own.
3.2 It is generally accepted that competition laws and their implementation
should be "nationality-blind," and should be concerned
exclusively with the impact on competition of the conduct or transaction
in question. The recently adopted ICN "Guiding Principles for
Merger Notification and Review" endorse non-discrimination
on the basis of nationality in the context of the merger review
process. Competition laws that are expressly drafted or implemented
so as to favor local as against foreign firms, distort trade and
undermine the credibility of competition policy generally. They
risk becoming instruments of protectionism rather than a guardian
of open and efficient markets.
3.3 Any WTO competition agreement, if one does come about, should
include an appropriately tailored prohibition on de jure nationality-based
discrimination. ICC considers that including de facto discrimination
in such a prohibition would, although attractive at the level of
principle, require further consultation and thinking in order to
see whether a workable line can be drawn between inappropriate de
facto discrimination and legitimate enforcement discretion, both
as an evidentiary matter and as a substantive matter.
3.4 The application of the non-discrimination principle to de facto
nationality-based discrimination in the context of competition law
raises complex issues. These issues are of two kinds. First, it
may prove difficult or impossible to identify instances of de facto
discrimination with any assurance. A competition authority that
wants to bend its policies or its enforcement decisions to favor
its nationals can cloak its actions in ostensible competition-based
rationales. Second, competition authorities exercise a wide range
of discretion in their enforcement decisions, both in choosing their
enforcement targets, in reaching their substantive conclusions,
and in choosing remedies. In considering this issue, the WTO should
take into account the risk that a binding rule against de facto
discrimination, accompanied by dispute resolution, could too easily
trigger supranational litigation of individual enforcement decisions
or enforcement policies, and deprive competition authorities of
a degree of necessary and legitimate discretion to enforce or not
to enforce in particular cases.
3.5 In adopting any nondiscrimination principle, it is important
not to sweep so broadly as to prohibit legitimate distinctions that
may coincide with nationality but that nonetheless have appropriate
nondiscriminatory bases. For example, evidence-gathering powers
will often differ for firms located abroad, in view of sovereignty
and other issues that may arise regarding foreign-located evidence.
Similarly, regulatory schemes in local markets result in differences
in the way competition law is applied in those markets and the way
it is applied to foreign-based firms that are not subject to the
same regulations. It is important to distinguish in these cases
between discrimination based on corporate nationality or ownership,
which generally should be unacceptable, and differences based on
where the firm is operating and what markets are affected by its
activities.
Important questions remain and need to be considered by the Working
Group about the application of a non-discrimination principle to
competition laws
3.6 Even a prohibition on de jure discrimination raises difficult
questions. Set out below are examples that should be considered
and resolved before adopting any binding non-discrimination principle.
These examples do not, of course, exhaust those that arise in examining
the nondiscrimination issue; but they do suggest that the issue
is more complex than it may at first seem, and that it requires
careful examination and analysis. Preliminary comments have been
offered on some of these examples.
3.6.1 Example 1: Under a bilateral or regional antitrust cooperation
agreement, a jurisdiction cooperates more closely with, or shares
information more extensively with, parties to the agreement than
with nonparties.
Comment: This does not constitute impermissible discrimination.
Competition authorities must have discretion to tailor their cooperation
to considerations that are specific to the other jurisdiction
involved.
3.6.2 Example 2: Under a positive comity or "who goes first"
agreement, a presumption is set up under which each party refers
enforcement action to the other party, in whose territory the
companies are based, the conduct is centered, or the effects of
the conduct predominate. The presumption does not apply to jurisdictions
that are not party to the agreement or to a similar agreement.
Comment: As in the last example, this does not constitute impermissible
discrimination. Given existing disparities among the world's competition
law regimes - disparities that are likely to persist for some
time - ICC believes that competition authorities should retain
discretion regarding the extent of their cooperation with, or
deference to enforcement by, authorities of other jurisdictions.
That discretion should not be viewed as inconsistent with the
principle of nondiscriminatory enforcement.
3.6.3 Example 3: A competition enforcement authority gives explicit
priority to effective enforcement against foreign-based cartels
whose members sell into its markets.
Comment: While there would be reasons for legitimate concern
if this competition authority chose to target foreign cartel participants
while ignoring equally culpable domestic participants, or equally
damaging domestic cartels, instances of this nature should not
be justiciable under internationally binding rules or dispute
resolution. Subjecting prosecutorial decision-making of this nature
to supranational review would unduly interfere with legitimate
discretion and resource allocation, and in effect impose an unwarranted
and artificial obligation to "balance" enforcement efforts
among a range of targets.
3.6.4 Example 4: A jurisdiction's enforcement policy restricts
aggressively competitive activities by large powerful firms in
order to protect small and medium firms. In the context of this
economy, the large powerful firms are foreign and the small and
medium-sized firms are local. Apart from policy questions that
are raised by a policy that may amount to protection of less efficient
firms, this does not necessarily constitute impermissible discrimination.
However, what if the jurisdiction passed a new law designed to
increase protection for small and medium firms and there was evidence
the law was intended to neutralize their foreign rivals' advantages
of efficiency and access to capital?
3.6.5 Example 5: A competition law that, by its express terms,
deals more harshly with, or denies exemptions or favorable treatment
to, non-nationals appears on its face to be discriminatory. Does
that mean that any exemption available to domestic, but not to
foreign, firms is suspect?
3.6.6 Example 6: A competition law requires filing and review
of international contracts, but has no such requirement for similar
contracts between domestic firms: does this constitute impermissible
discrimination?
4. Due Process and Transparency
Overview
4.1 ICC strongly believes that due process and transparency are
important core principles to be respected and applied in the design,
implementation and enforcement of competition laws at the national
level and with respect to any multi-jurisdictional enforcement cooperation.
Both principles are essential because they provide stakeholders
- the public, consumers and competitors - some assurance that the
system will produce consistent and rational results and generate
confidence in the system of competition law enforcement. Those jurisdictions
with the longest traditions of competition law enforcement have
managed to create a consensus for such laws and policies by trying
to grapple with these issues and to continually balance the interests
of a rigorous competitive process with concerns for due process
and fair play. It is perhaps all the more important that laws and
policies enacted to safeguard the competitive process be seen to
be administered in a transparent and fair manner.
4.2 The following are suggested key due process and transparency
elements of competition policy offering a preliminary view of elements
that need to be considered and resolved before adopting any binding
principles of due process and transparency in the WTO context, should
this prove desirable. These questions do not, of course, exhaust
those that arise in examining these issues; but they do suggest
that the issues are complex ones that require careful examination
and analysis. Many of these values are endorsed in the "Guiding
Principles for Merger Notification and Review" recently adopted
by the ICN which should be an important basis for any discussions
on issues of transparency and due process in the WTO . The institutional
framework that best provides the checks and balances desirable from
a business perspective is one that combines both administrative
proceedings and private suits in national courts. However, these
suggested elements would apply with equal force to regimes that
rely exclusively on formal participation in administrative proceedings
or those that rely exclusively on private suits before national
courts.
4.2.1 Mechanism for bringing matters before competition agency.
The process should provide a mechanism whereby anyone can bring
a matter to the attention (by complaint or otherwise) of the competition
agency; such complaint should identify the interests and competitive
problems they seek to address. Agencies should develop appropriate
systems to filter out spurious complaints.
4.2.2 Right to be advised of progress and reasons for decisions.
Those who bring matters to the attention of the competition authority
should, to the extent practicable and appropriate, be kept advised
of the progress of the authority's examination and its ultimate
determination, including reasons for not initiating an investigation
or launching proceedings if applicable, having regard to confidentiality
obligations.
4.2.3 Right to notice and disclosure of investigations. Persons
subject to investigation should be advised at the earliest possible
time of the nature of the matters under investigation and the
basis for the investigation, unless doing so would materially
prejudice the authority's enforcement obligations. Further, persons
with a "legitimate interest" in the proceedings should
receive notice and disclosure of investigations at the earliest
time practicable. Persons with a "legitimate interest"
should include complainants and third parties who satisfy the
appropriate authority that they will be directly and significantly
affected by the conduct being investigated.
4.2.4 Right to make submissions. Persons subject to investigation
and persons with a legitimate interest in matters being considered
by the competition authorities should be allowed to make written
or oral submissions to the authorities at any time as well as
offer evidence and participate in formal hearings or proceedings.
4.2.5 Independent and objective decision. The first decision
should be an independent and objective assessment by the deciding
body.
4.2.6 Transparency of substantive and procedural rules. The substantive
and procedural rules, including evidentiary rules must be transparent.
In order to foster consistency, practicability and fairness, the
process should be transparent with respect to the policies, practices
and procedures involved in the review, the identity of the decision-maker(s),
the substantive standard of review, and the basis of any adverse
enforcement decisions on the merits.
4.2.7 Right of appeal. A timely appeal of decisions to an independent
judicial authority should be provided.
4.2.8 Timely decisions. Decision-making by agency and appellate
bodies must be timely. (Deadlines for responding to complaints
and for completing investigations and proceedings should be stated
in advance, but the agency could have the opportunity to extend
these for good faith reasons or, in a merger investigations, with
the consent of the merging parties). Competition authorities should
be accountable for adherence to stipulated timelines.
4.2.9 Ability to challenge investigatory measures. Throughout
the investigation, there should be an effective ability to challenge
the investigatory measures employed.
4.2.10 Clear and transparent process standards; adequate protection
of information. The investigatory and judicial process, both within
individual jurisdictions and in the multijurisdictional investigation
context, should have established standards that are clear and
transparent and provide adequate protection of competitively sensitive,
proprietary information and information subject to legal or other
privilege. Legal privilege should apply without discrimination
to both lawyers called to the local bar and to those called to
foreign bars, and should also extend to in-house lawyers who are
governed by the same code of ethics as lawyers in private practice.
4.2.11 Adherence to due process standards binding. The agency
should be bound by legal rules to adhere to its due process standards
and at least be subject to a rule excluding evidence obtained
contrary to due process standards.
4.2.12 Jurisdictional nexus. Jurisdiction should be asserted
only over transactions and conduct that have an appropriate nexus
with the jurisdiction concerned. Determination of the nexus to
the jurisdiction of a transaction or conduct should be based on
whether the transaction or conduct is likely to have a significant,
direct and immediate economic effect within the jurisdiction concerned.
4.2.13 Reasonable and proportionate remedies. Remedies for anti-competitive
conduct must be reasonable, proportionate and linked by an appropriate
causal nexus to the specific anti-competitive harm or conduct
alleged, having regard to legitimate enforcement concerns relating
to deterrence and compensation.
5. Technical Assistance, Capacity Building and Competition Advocacy
5.1 The Doha Declaration set out two tasks for the WTO in the area
of capacity building. In Paragraph 24, WTO commits to cooperating
with other intergovernmental organizations in providing technical
assistance to developing countries to "better evaluate the
implications of closer multilateral cooperation for their development
policies and objectives". Paragraph 25 of the Doha Declaration
sets out the more analytical mandate of the WTO Working Group to
reflect upon and to clarify the issues relating to the reinforcement
of competition institutions in developing countries through capacity
building.
5.2 Pursuant to paragraph 24 and in the run-up to the Cancun Ministerial
meeting, the WTO secretariat has been cooperating with organizations
such as UNCTAD in organizing meetings to help developing countries
better understand the possible consequences of negotiations on a
multilateral framework on competition so that they are prepared
for discussions at the Cancun Ministerial.
5.3 ICC supports educational efforts made by WTO to ensure that
all WTO members enter into discussions on this important topic with
sufficient understanding of the complex issues involved. ICC refers
to its views set out elsewhere in this paper on the principles of
non-discrimination, due process and transparency, and on hard core
cartels, which might be useful to the WTO in raising its members'
awareness on different aspects of these issues.
5.4 ICC believes, however, that it would not be appropriate for
WTO to advocate any particular substantive principles or approach
to competition policy - other than the core principles examined
above - unless and until further thinking and consultation allow
reaching a common understanding as to the proper premise and substantive
underpinnings of competition policy.
5.5 The world's competition policy regimes vary widely in content,
with many mandating conflicting rules on business, and many allowing
different nation-states and regional groupings to issue conflicting
commands to businesses engaged in trade in more than one nation.
5.6 While many governments subscribe to the beneficial effects
of competition policy regimes in mature economies as an act of faith,
some question their efficacy for other types of economies, while
still others strongly advocate their adoption as beneficial for
all. There is conflict even among the most mature economies, such
as the US and the EU, about the appropriate premise and substantive
underpinnings of competition policy, which historically has progressed
from populist notions of "fairness" and "anti-large
business" to a more refined appreciation of a consumer welfare
focus, based on modern economic thinking. Even this is tempered
with the realization that innovation is changing the global landscape
of business, adding new dimensions to the competitive process that
have yet to be assimilated in competition policy rules.
Any WTO-mandated capacity building efforts should therefore be directed
in priority toward implementation of "core principles"
and, where appropriate, to developing agencies' capacity for sound
economic analysis. Capacity building should not be designed to promote
enforcement of substantive competition law rules on which there
is not a sufficient level of consensus.
5.7 In this respect, ICC welcomes the Working Group's recognition
in its 2002 Report that, in the context of capacity building, a
"one size fits all approach" is not appropriate as each
country should be free to choose how to apply a competition regime
in a way that reflects its economic situation and development objectives.
It also supports the Working Group's view that developing countries
should be allowed to take a phased approach to the discussion, introduction
and implementation of competition legislation. ICC would add that
while countries should also have the scope to determine whether
to choose to adopt a competition regime, every country that does
so should adhere to the "core principles" of non-discrimination,
due process and transparency .
Role of WTO
5.8 In considering how the WTO could most helpfully fulfill its
mandate to provide technical assistance to developing countries,
ICC suggests that the following factors should be considered.
5.9 Numerous international organizations are already actively involved
in efforts to bring some intellectual harmonization or convergence
to the disparate competition policy rules now in force, and also
to promote the adoption of modern competition policy rules. Most
recently, some 60 governments (all members of the United Nations
and the World Trade Organization) have joined the ICN, a virtual
organization of governmental competition agencies, devoted to meetings
and working groups exploring the content of competition policy rules,
enforcement mechanisms, and technical assistance and capacity building
issues. The OECD has for years
undertaken efforts of convergence and advocacy, with programs such
as its Global Competition Forum. UNCTAD's efforts now span more
than four decades. UNESCO, the World Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund have all been involved in promoting the adoption of
competition policy rules-with varying content over the years, it
might be noted. Many of these organizations are devoting substantial
efforts at reducing the conflicts between nations growing out of
the varying competition policy statutes. Many individual governments,
such as the US agencies and the EC, have devoted, and continue to
devote, considerable resources on both promotion and convergence
of competition policies.
5.10 To preserve its scant resources and to allow it to focus on
its primary role as an organization for negotiating and administering
international trade rules, ICC suggests that the WTO should carefully
consider whether to devote further resources to capacity building
initiatives. If the WTO does pursue such initiatives, it should
continue to work in the area of technical assistance in cooperation
with, and through, organizations already active in this field.
5.11 ICC also suggests that the WTO deploy its expertise and utilize
survey and coordination functions to assist the other international
organizations and member governments in the activities they are
already conducting in the competition policy area. Because more
nations are members of the WTO than are members or participants
in the efforts of these other organizations, it might also be useful
for the WTO to comment to the other international organizations
and member governments on needs, issues, and focus of activity.
5.12 Specifically, because of its broader membership base, a WTO
survey of its members (and the other, non-member nations who are
members of the United Nations) with respect to various aspects of
competition policy, administration and enforcement might be useful.
The survey could be designed to elicit their competition policy
laws, the budgets and personnel of their enforcement agencies, the
exemptions and immunities from the competition regime, the priorities
of those agencies, and the perceived needs of the member governments
for technical assistance and capacity building.
5.13 Such a survey might form the initial database of information
on competition policy regimes, which member governments might make
use of in evaluating their own activities, and which the other active
organizations in the field might make use of. If this proved useful,
the survey, periodically conducted, might be broadened to include
questions on the current and planned activities of others in the
areas of technical assistance, capacity building, and competition
advocacy. The objective of broadening the survey would be to include
in the general database information on other agencies' and governments'
efforts, which might help coordinate the myriad of activities being
undertaken. Periodic monitoring of the situation, i.e. of the elements
disclosed in the survey, and reports on the situation might be useful
to the world community, as it evaluates whether progress is being
made in producing a global trading system where the constituent
national elements have competitive free markets.
5.14 Finally, while the instances of competition policy producing
impediments to international trade probably constitute a very small
subset of such impediments, it might be useful for the WTO to issue
reports on the impact of competition rules on international trade,
with particular reference to the application of the principle of
non-discrimination. This might become a part of the regular Trade
Policy Review Mechanism of the WTO, which in essence is a peer review
mechanism.
6. Hard Core Cartels
Overview
6.1 ICC fully supports increased international co-operation focussed
on the detection and punishment of hard core cartels. Nevertheless,
the pursuit of this worthwhile objective does not negate the need
for legal safeguards and protections for parties involved in investigations
(who may or may not be proved guilty), especially as penalties for
antitrust offences are becoming increasingly serious and the risk
arises of multiple penalties for the same transgression. The fact
that more and more jurisdictions have introduced, or are considering
introducing, criminal sanctions for these offences, makes the need
for legal safeguards and proportionality in penalties imposed even
more imperative bearing in mind human rights statutes, both national
and international.
6.2 In addition, as a result of some recent US case developments,
businesses and legal advisors, both within and outside the US, are
increasingly concerned about the implications of information sharing
among competition authorities. These developments may give rise
to pressure on competition authorities and governments to reject
bilateral or multilateral cooperation arrangements that override
domestic protections for confidential and privileged information.
6.3 Recognizing the ever-changing contextual landscape, there are
four key issues to consider in any discussion of a possible multilateral
framework for addressing "hard core cartel" behavior:
(i) What is a "hard core cartel"? In defining the term,
consideration should be given to such matters as whether the proscribed
conduct includes only horizontal agreements (not vertical agreement),
whether there should be a distinction between covert and overt
activities, and what recognition, if any, should be given to efficiency-enhancing
activities.
(ii) What are the appropriate procedural safeguards in the context
of investigating and prosecuting parties who have participated
in hard core cartels?
(iii) What are the appropriate safeguards for protecting confidential
business information in the context of inter-agency co-operation
in pursuing and prosecuting hard core cartel activity?
(iv) Is the WTO framework suited to address the foregoing and
related issues given the great disparity in substantive principles
and treatment of hard core cartels among WTO members?
Definition of "Hard Core Cartel"
6.4 Before engaging in any substantive discussion, the various
parties and stakeholders must have a common understanding or reference
point with regard to the type of activities to which enforcement
co-operation is directed. The definition will in part depend on
the enforcement measures applicable to the conduct. For example,
if the behavior is punishable per se and the penalties for engaging
in the activity are serious criminal sanctions, it may be appropriate
to define the term narrowly.
6.5 In Draft BIAC Talking Points dated 07/02/01 to the OECD CLP
WP3 Roundtable on Information Sharing in Cartel Cases, BIAC noted
that the business community has differing views on the definition
of a hard core cartel based on the fact that different jurisdictions
have different laws which govern activities that may be considered
hard core cartel behaviour in one jurisdiction and not another.
6.6 The OECD Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective
Action Against Hard Core Cartels adopted on March 25, 1998 defines
"a hard core cartel" as follows:
"A 'hard core cartel' is an anti-competitive agreement, anti-competitive
concerted practice, or anti-competitive arrangement by competitors
to fix prices, make rigged bids (collusive tenders), establish output
restrictions or quotas, or share or divide markets by allocating
customers, suppliers, territories or lines of commerce."
"The hard core cartel category does not include agreements,
concerted practices, or arrangements that (i) are reasonably related
to the lawful realization of cost-reducing or output-enhancing efficiencies,
(ii) are excluded directly or indirectly from the coverage of a
Member country's own laws, or (iii) are authorized in accordance
with those laws. However, all exclusions and authorizations of what
would otherwise be hard core cartels should be transparent and should
be reviewed periodically to assess whether they are both necessary
and no broader than necessary to achieve their overriding policy
objectives."
6.7 While the OECD definition of "hard core cartel" provides
a strong foundation upon which to build, and represents a consensus
among the members of the OECD, it does not address the distinction
between covert and non-covert activities, which is currently a subject
of discussion among stakeholders. For example, many believe that
agreements between competitors regarding prices, quantities, markets
or customers that are arrived at and carried out in a covert manner
are the most egregious activities and should be per se unlawful.
A related issue is whether there should be a mechanism for exemption
from per se categorization as a result of notification of an agreement
to the relevant competition authorities or the public. Another issue
is the appropriate treatment to be given to efficiency enhancing
agreements. The OECD definition of "hard core cartel"
is in terms that the definition judges behaviour in advance.
6.8 ICC recommends at a minimum the following guiding principles:
6.8.1 Horizontal agreements only. Hard core cartels ought to
be confined to horizontal agreements, properly defined, between
competitors, and should not extend, for example, to an agreement
between two or more undertakings each of which operates, for the
purposes of the agreement, at a different level of the production
or distribution chain. In section 8 of "Discussion Points
on Information Sharing in International Cartel Investigations"
submitted by BIAC to the OECD Global Forum on Competition on February
15, 2002, BIAC suggested that hard core cartel behaviour means
(i) horizontal price fixing agreements, (ii) horizontal bid rigging,
and (iii) horizontal market allocation.
6.8.2 Recognition of efficiency enhancing activity. Even where
a jurisdiction adopts a "per se" category of hard core
cartels, there should always be some opportunity to demonstrate
in an appropriately unbiased forum the efficiency enhancing aspects
of an agreement, even in a case that involves elements of price
fixing, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc., et al. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., et al., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
6.8.3 Affiliates excluded. Hard core cartels should not include
agreements between affiliates or entities within the same economic
unit.
Procedural Safeguards
6.9 The following are appropriate key procedural safeguards to
consider in any multilateral framework for addressing hard core
cartel activity.
6.9.1 Non-discrimination. Competition laws and regulations applicable
to hard core cartels should be applied without discrimination
on the basis of the nationality or location of the parties.
6.9.2 Transparency. The hard core cartel investigation process
should be transparent with respect to the policies, practices,
and procedures involved in the review, the identity of the decision-makers,
and the standard of review. Transparency should foster consistency
and predictability of the outcomes of hard core cartel investigations.
6.9.3 Due process. Appropriate procedural safeguards should be
available to ensure that the hard core cartel investigation process
incorporates core principles of due process and procedural fairness.
Specific safeguards are discussed in Part 4 - Due Process and
Transparency.
Safeguards for Confidential Information
6.10 The exchange of confidential information between competition
authorities continues to be of concern to the international business
community. Such exchanges should include appropriate safeguards
to prevent leaks, and greater transparency to improve business confidence,
avoid adverse commercial consequences and protect the rights of
companies targeted for investigation. (See ICC Statement on International
Cooperation between Antitrust Authorities no. 225/450 rev. 3 of
28 March 1996; ICC Recommendations to ICPAC on Exchange of Confidential
Information between Competition Authorities in the Merger Context
no. 225/52 of 21 May 1999, and ICC/BIAC Comments on report of the
US International Competition Policy Advisory Committee no. 225/554
Rev. of 5 June 2000).
6.11 The hard core cartel investigation process, both within individual
jurisdictions and in the multi-jurisdictional investigation context,
should have established standards that are clear and transparent,
and provide adequate protection of confidential information, consistent
with the need for such disclosures as may be necessary for effective
enforcement by competition authorities in the jurisdictions concerned.
A number of issues relevant to information sharing between antitrust
authorities in the context of hard core cartel investigations are
discussed in the February 15, 2002 BIAC Discussion Points referred
to above.
6.12 The following is a list of safeguards specific to information
exchanges among competition authorities
6.12.1 Prior notification. The owner or provider of the information
should receive prior notice of any proposed exchange of information
and an opportunity to be heard on: (a) the necessity of such exchange;
and (b) whether information is confidential or not, unless doing
so would be prejudicial to the investigation. When, for the latter
reason, prior notice is not given, information should be exchanged
only with the approval of an independent judicial arbiter.
6.12.2 Solicitor-client privilege protection. A receiving jurisdiction
should not receive or use information that would be considered
privileged under the recipient's own law and a loss of privilege
should not occur as a result of the sharing of confidential information
between antitrust authorities in different jurisdictions. The
privilege should be respected regardless of the lawyer's bar origin
and including communications with in-house lawyers who are subject
to rules of ethics comparable to those applied to independent
lawyers.
6.12.3 Substantial convergence and similarity in laws. The highest
standard of protection in either jurisdiction should be provided
in order to avoid conflicts.
6.12.4 Consistency with immunity/amnesty programs. Rules governing
information exchange should encourage, rather than interfere with,
immunity/amnesty programs.
6.12.5 Reciprocity: The receiving party must agree to reciprocate
as a condition of exchange.
6.12.6 Facilitation, not delay. Any exchange of information should
speed up the investigation process rather than lead to extra delays.
6.12.7 Substantive case and jurisdiction. Information exchange
should only take place where there is a substantive case as well
as jurisdiction over the parties in matters at issue, rather than
only suspicion.
6.12.8 Use of information/no further disclosure. The information
should be used by the receiving authority only for the purpose
for which it was disclosed, be subject to conditions of confidentiality
at least as stringent as those of the jurisdiction supplying the
information, and not be disclosed to any parties outside the receiving
authority, in particular, potential third party plaintiffs, other
agencies or foreign governments. There should also be an assurance
that the authority has exhausted its own administrative procedures
and possibilities before making a request.
The Role of the WTO
6.13 Any discussion about the appropriate definition and treatment
of hard core cartel activity at the WTO level should recognize that
there are significant issues that need to be addressed on which
there is little consensus among the various stakeholders. In addition
to the foregoing, there are issues regarding the extent to which
any framework will address government procurement, exemptions from
cartel laws such as state action immunity, and how to recognize
differences between common law and civil code jurisdictions.
6.14 Given the complexity of the issues, as reflected in paragraph
2.3 of the summary, the issue of the inclusion of substantive rules
on hard core cartels in the WTO system should be weighed carefully
as the WTO proceeds with its meetings later this year.
7. Modalities of Cooperation
Introduction and summary
7.1 This part sets out ICC's perspective on the appropriate scope
for voluntary cooperation among competition authorities. The Working
Group has already reviewed the history of prior and existing bilateral
and multilateral cooperation efforts, and we will not reiterate
that background except as it bears directly on our suggestions.
7.2 In summary, ICC:
7.2.1 Supports efforts by competition authorities to cooperate
with one another with the objectives of :
· formulating and adopting coherent, consumer-welfare oriented
competition policies;
· fostering the use of "best practices" in the implementation
of their competition laws; and
· ensuring that related investigations and proceedings ongoing
in multiple jurisdictions are handled in a way that is efficient
for the agencies and for the businesses involved and that promotes
economically and legally sound and consistent outcomes.
7.2.2 Stresses the importance of assuring effective and adequate
protection for confidential information. (In that regard, see
Part 6 - Hard Core Cartels)
7.2.3 Urges that individual competition authorities retain flexibility
and discretion in the nature and extent of their cooperation with
competition authorities of other jurisdictions, taking into account,
among other things, the sufficiency of protections for confidential
information, the impact on the cooperating authority's own investigation
or proceeding, the degree of policy convergence or divergence,
and demands on the authority's resources.
7.2.4 Supports the use of appropriate voluntary "peer review"
mechanisms that periodically subject jurisdictions' competition
regimes to in-depth scrutiny and comment, but that do not include
dispute resolution mechanisms or other compulsory measures that
would result in "second guessing" individual jurisdictions'
enforcement decisions.
Discussion
7.3 The importance of cooperation among competition authorities
has increased in recent years. The reasons include the proliferation
of revised or newly adopted competition laws around the world; the
frequency with which transactions are subject to review in multiple
jurisdictions; a perceived need to combat hard core cartel activity
at both local and international levels and a growing appreciation
of the importance of an appropriate balance between the need for
sound and effective competition law enforcement on the one hand,
and on the other hand, the importance to economic growth and efficiency
of an environment in which legitimate mergers and other transactions
are not impeded or deterred by unnecessary delay, cost and uncertainty.
7.4 Antitrust authorities have responded to the need for expanding
cooperation in a number of ways. First, the network of bilateral
cooperation agreements has expanded rapidly, while jurisdictions
that have had agreements in place are revising or replacing old
agreements with new arrangements based on their more recent experience.
The US was the earliest jurisdiction to build a bilateral cooperation
network, in its early period to deal with jurisdictional conflicts
and more recently to manage the growing demand for more extensive
enforcement cooperation. Agreements have been entered into between
other pairs of jurisdictions in all parts of the world, sometimes
similar to the US bilateral model, and in other cases custom-designed
to address the particular needs and interests of the jurisdictions
involved.
7.5 Most bilateral agreements leave the parties substantial discretion
to apply them in a way that does not prejudice their important policy
or enforcement interests. Few bilateral agreements allow jurisdictions
to share confidential company information with one another.
7.6 Experience with bilateral competition agreements has influenced
the development of multilateral arrangements, and vice-versa. Probably
the best known multilateral instrument dealing with competition
law cooperation is the OECD Council Recommendation Concerning Co-operation
Between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Affecting
International Trade. The Recommendation is non-binding, although
most OECD members purport to adhere to it in - albeit to differing
degrees and with a range of interpretations.
7.7 The OECD Recommendation's provisions are basically similar
to - and have influenced and been influenced by - what has become
the US's de facto bilateral model agreement, which also has been
followed by several other jurisdictions. The OECD recommendation
does not call for multilateral cooperation as such. Instead, it
is a recommendation about the way in which member countries should
cooperate with one another in their bilateral dealings.
7.8 The Recommendation calls for the parties to notify one another
when they launch an investigation under competition law that significantly
affects the other party's interests. Triggering circumstances include
investigations of conduct in the other's territory, or of conduct
the other government may have required or endorsed; mergers involving
one or more firms incorporated in the other party or one of its
political subdivisions; cases in which the remedy will require or
prohibit conduct in the other party's territory; and, in some agreements,
seeking information located in the other party's territory.
7.9 The Recommendation also includes a "positive comity"
provision - i.e., an acknowledgment that one party may ask the other
to act against anticompetitive conduct in the latter's territory
that adversely affects the interests of both parties.
7.10 In recent years the OECD has expanded its "peer review"
examinations of member countries', and in some cases non-member
countries', competition law regimes. These reviews are similar to
those carried out in the WTO as part of its Trade Policy Review
Mechanism, but with a deeper examination of competition policy than
has been possible so far in the WTO context.
Although these peer review exercises normally include discussion
of individual cases as illustrative of the examined jurisdictions
approach, their focus is on the overall competition regime. They
are not designed to be critiques of individual agency decisions.
By most accounts, these examinations have been a valuable impetus
to convergence around best practices and policies.
7.11 In addition, several WTO agreements provide that members will
inform the committees established under these agreements of their
legislation, regulations and administrative practices. They may
be discussed in the committees and other members may and do raise
questions. The committees are not mandated to make findings on the
member country's legislation, etc. Under some agreements Members
are required to report on a yearly or a six-month basis on measures
taken. Here again other members may express views on the consistency
of these measures with the relevant agreement but the committees
are not mandated to make findings.
7.12 The regular meetings of the various WTO committees are often
used to raise bilaterally certain issues in the margin of these
meetings. It is sometimes surprising to see that potential disputes
result from misunderstandings that are cleared up in such bilateral
informal discussions.
7.13 In addition to multilateral efforts at the OECD and WTO, the
EU is in the process of putting in place an elaborate network for
cooperation among the Commission and Member State competition authorities.
This network, however, will operate in the context of the extensive
legal and political integration of the EU, a level of integration
which is not mirrored at the WTO or global level or, in most instances,
at regional levels elsewhere in the world.
ICC's recommendations
7.14 ICC endorses constructive efforts among competition authorities
to cooperate with one another and supports ongoing voluntary efforts
to put into place a basic framework for cooperation . Cooperation
can help to achieve important objectives that provide a public benefit
both to consumers and to businesses, both as consumers and competitors.
7.15 First, the sharing of experience among authorities at different
levels of development, and among authorities applying differing
procedures and substantive rules, benefits all participants. It
helps identify the policies and procedures best designed to promote
coherent, consumer-welfare oriented competition policies. In addition,
it facilitates the identification and use of "best practices"
in the design and implementation of competition laws. Further, it
helps to ensure that related investigations and proceedings ongoing
in multiple jurisdictions are handled in a way that is efficient
for the authorities and for the businesses involved and that promotes
economically and legally sound and consistent outcomes.
7.16 ICC stresses the importance of ensuring that cooperation among
competition authorities is based on effective and adequate protection
for confidential information. Competition authorities that receive
confidential information from businesses normally are obliged under
their national laws to protect that information against further
disclosure. These protections serve a range of important and legitimate
interests, including due process, damage to competition that could
result from the release of competitively sensitive information,
property rights in trade secrets and business confidential information,
privacy, and respect for the balances struck in individual jurisdictions
between these interests and the specific law enforcement objectives
and processes in place. In crafting mechanisms to enhance inter-jurisdictional
cooperation, it is essential to avoid creating a presumption in
favor of the sharing of confidential information that risks damaging
these important interests. Appropriate safeguards for confidential
information in the context of information sharing are discussed
in Part 6 - Hard Core Cartels.
7.17 It is important that individual competition authorities retain
flexibility and discretion in the nature and extent of their cooperation
with competition authorities of other jurisdictions. If for no other
reason, in a world of 100 or more separate competition authorities,
the tasks of cooperation and coordination can impose substantial
cost and resource drains on individual agencies which could overtax
the resources of requested agencies and potentially interfere with
their own enforcement responsibilities. Agencies must have discretion
to decide when and how to cooperate with other authorities, taking
into account, among other things, the impact on the cooperating
authority's own investigation or proceeding, the degree of policy
convergence or divergence, and demands on the authority's resources.
The sufficiency of protections for any confidential information
proposed to be exchanged must also be take into account in any such
cooperation.
7.18 ICC encourages the expanded use of appropriate voluntary "peer
review" mechanisms that periodically subject jurisdictions'
competition regimes to in-depth scrutiny and comment. Peer review
mechanisms such as those conducted under the OECD's Regulatory Review
program and the WTO's TPRM subject competition regimes to the discipline
of the "marketplace of ideas," while leaving individual
jurisdictions discretion to alter or maintain their laws and policies.
Peer review mechanisms should not be used as dispute resolution
for "second guessing" of individual enforcement decisions.
7.19 Effective peer review is likely to be a more effective mechanism
for convergence toward sound policies and best practices than vaguely-worded
multilaterally-agreed rules that leave broad discretion in their
interpretation and application.
Document n° 225/580 Rev.3
9 April 2003
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